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Abstract
Ravenna and Walsh (2010) develop a linear quadratic framework for optimal mone-
tary policy analysis in a New Keynesian model featuring search and matching frictions
and show that maximization of expected utility of the representative household is
equivalent to minimizing a quadratic loss function that consists of ination, and two
appropriately dened gaps involving unemployment and labor market tightness. This
paper generalizes their analysis, most importantly by relaxing the Hosios (1990) con-
dition which eliminates the distortions resulting from labor market ine¢ ciencies, such
that the equilibrium level of unemployment under exible prices would not necessarily
be optimal. I take account of steady-state distortions using the methodology of Benigno
and Woodford (2005) and derive a quadratic loss function that involves the same three
terms, albeit with di¤erent relative weights and denitions for unemployment- and la-
bor market tightness gaps. I evaluate the resulting loss function subject to a simple set
of log-linearized equilibrium relationships and perform policy analysis. The key result
of the paper is that search externalities give rise to an endogenous cost push term in
the new Keynesian Phillips curve, suggesting a case against complete price stability as
the only goal of monetary policy, because there is now a trade-o¤ between stabilizing
ination and reducing ine¢ cient unemployment uctuations. Transitory movements of
ination in this environment helps job creation and hence prevents excessive volatility
of unemployment.
JEL Classications: E52, E61, J64.
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1 Introduction
Given the wide-spread attention to rising unemployment gures associated with the recent
nancial crisis as well as the world-wide use of expansionary monetary policy in response to
the global recession, a couple of questions arise in policy debates. What are the consequences
of labour market ine¢ ciencies for the conduct of optimal monetary policy? Is there a trade-o¤
between stabilizing CPI ination and reducing ine¢ cient unemployment uctuations? In this
paper, I address these questions in a New Keynesian model featuring search and matching
distortions. The main objective is to focus on the implications for optimal monetary policy
of search externalities. By optimal policy I mean the one that minimizes an intertemporal
loss function subject to the models equilibrium relationships under commitment. I make
a contribution to the literature by deriving an explicit expression for the welfare objective
in the presence of search externalities; those that distort the steady state of the model and
render the standard Linear Quadratic (LQ) methods of Benigno and Woodford (2003) and
Woodford (2003) inapplicable. I also reduce the equilibrium dynamics of the model into
a simple log-linear representation in ination, unemployment gap, and the labor market
tightness gap to make the framework more tractable. The resulting generalized LQ model
enables me to evaluate the model-driven quadratic loss function and perform policy analysis.
The key result of the paper is that labor market ine¢ ciencies matter for optimal monetary
policy. In contrast to recent ndings in the New Keynesian Search literature, I show that
the optimal ination rate is typically non-zero because it is used to indirectly attenuate the
externality that arises from search and matching frictions, one that is usually eliminated
in earlier papers by assuming an e¢ cient labor market allocation, see Ravenna and Walsh
(2010) and Thomas (2008) for example. Since search externalities generate an endogenous
cost push term in the new Keynesian Phillips curve, the policy maker faces a trade-o¤
between stabilizing ination and reducing ine¢ cient unemployment uctuations.
Two main features underlie the search and matching models of equilibrium unemploy-
ment. First, existing matches command a surplus in equilibrium as hiring rms and searching
workers have to spend resources before matches can take place. Second, matching models ex-
hibit congestion or search externalities due to the tightness of the labor market, the relative
number of hiring rms to searching workers. These externalities are due to the fact that one
additional searching worker in the market increases the probability that a hiring rm will
match with a job-seeker but decreases the probability that a searching worker already in the
market will match with a rm. Hosios (1990) shows that search externalities are balanced,
and thereby labor market allocations (market tightness and unemployment) are Pareto e¢ -
cient, when the bargaining power of workers equals the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to vacancies. Although Hosios condition need not hold empirically most studies
in the literature are constrained to this simplifying parameter conguration. I depart from
this unappealing assumption to explicitly study the implications for optimal monetary policy
of search externalities when the NK model is augmented with unemployment and policy is
based on an intertemporal model-consistent loss function.
Given the attractiveness of the non-Walrasian search and matching model of equilibrium
unemployment, a growing number of papers have incorporated it into the standard New
Keynesian (NK) framework to explore its implications for macro dynamics and/or optimal
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monetary policy.1 The NK model featuring search frictions consists mainly of three distor-
tions: 1) monopolistic competition, 2) staggered price setting, and 3) congestion externalities
which create ine¢ cient labor market allocations. The rst two are present in a canonical
NK approach to monetary policy analysis but the third one is absent due to the assumption
of Walrasian labor markets. In a simple NK model without unemployment it is possible
to show that under certain assumptions,2 an optimizing policy maker can implement the
e¢ cient (i.e. exible price) allocation through a zero ination (optimal) policy and does
not face a trade-o¤ between stabilization of ination and reducing the gap between actual
output and the exible price level of output. Blanchard and Gali (2008), Ravenna and Walsh
(2010), and Thomas (2008) extend the optimal monetary policy analysis to a NK framework
featuring search and matching frictions. They derive linear quadratic (LQ) models which
consist of linear structural equations and quadratic loss functions and show that monetary
policy prescriptions of standard new Keynesian models are preserved in this new integrated
setting, albeit in the absence of wage rigidities. However, for the LQ approach to provide
correct welfare rankings, they assume an e¢ cient (non distorted) steady state by imposing
the Hosios parameter conguration which eliminates the congestion externalities.3
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that the LQ approach to the optimal policy problem
can preserve correct welfare rankings even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary
extent if second order approximations are taken to the model structural relations (specically,
to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve). Making use of this general approach I obtain a
welfare-theoretic loss function that consists of ination, and two appropriately dened gaps
involving unemployment and labor market tightness as well as a simple and intuitive log-
linear representation of the models equilibrium dynamics in these three variables. The
resulting model-driven welfare criterion di¤ers signicantly from those obtained in Ravenna
and Walsh (2010), and Thomas (2008) because the degree of distortion of the steady state,
owing to search externalities, a¤ects the weights on the stabilization objectives of the policy
maker in the loss function. The coe¢ cients in the quadratic approximation depend on the
underlying structural parameters of the model that govern preferences, the degree of nominal
price rigidity, and the search and bargaining processes in the labor market.
The results obtained in this work add to the rich debate on optimal monetary policy. More
specically, congestion externalities suggest a case against complete price stability as the only
goal of monetary policy and generate a trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and reducing
ine¢ cient unemployment uctuations.4 When the bargaining power of workers is higher
than the vacancy elasticity of the matching function (search ine¢ ciencies exist), productivity
shocks create a gap between the exible price equilibrium and the social planners allocation
(rst best), and generate a cost push term in the new Keynesian Phillips curve. In this case,
1Examples include Blanchard and Gali (2007), Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), Gertler and Trigari
(2009), Ravenna and Walsh (2008a), Ravenna and Walsh (2010), Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008),
Thomas (2008), Trigari (2009), Walsh (2003), and Walsh (2005).
2The existence of an output subsidy that o¤sets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically
competitive price-setters is essential. With this assumption, the steady state under a zero-ination policy
involves an e¢ cient level of output.
3Labor market e¢ ciency ensures that the exible price equilibrium is exactly the same as the social
planners allocation.
4Blanchard and Gali (2008) and Thomas (2008) nd that real-wage rigidity and staggered wage adjust-
ment create a case against price stability, respectively.
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the policy maker can employ a zero ination policy to achieve the exible price equilibrium
but not the rst best. Consequently, complete price stability cannot ensure an e¢ cient labor
market allocation. The policy maker faces an unemployment/ination trade-o¤ because
it can only steer rms incentives to post vacancies towards the e¢ cient level and reduce
ine¢ cient unemployment when prices are sticky but not when they are exible. Deviation
from complete price stability in this environment helps job creation and thereby reduces
excessive unemployment uctuations.
These ndings are in line with what is being argued in Faia (2009). She uses a Ramsey
framework with quadratic price adjustment costs and matching frictions in the labor market
to study the implications of steady-state distortions (monopolistic competition and search
externalities) for the conduct of optimal monetary policy. However, the methodology and
approach that I adopt di¤er from hers in many respects, highlighted by the fact that I
derive a micro-founded linear quadratic model under an ine¢ cient steady state as opposed
to the Ramsey approach that she takes. The LQ framework enables me to provide analytical
insights on the Central Banks objectives in presence of sticky prices and labor search frictions
as well as a simple linear representation of the models equilibrium equations. It is along the
above dimensions that these two papers complement each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Sections 3 describes the rst best allocation as well as the exible price equilibrium. The
linear quadratic model is derived in section 4. The main ndings of the paper are presented
in section 5, where policy analysis is conducted under alternative parameterization. Finally,
section 6 summarizes the results, concludes, and proposes some possible extensions.
2 The Model Economy
The model economy consists of four sectors: 1) households whose utility depends on con-
sumption of nal goods, and their members are either in a match (employed) or searching for
a new match (unemployed).5 2) wholesale rms who employ labor and produce intermediate
goods in a perfectly competitive market. They face search frictions and bargain with workers
over wages. 3) monopolistically competitive retailers who purchase intermediate goods from
the wholesale sector, set the price of transformed goods in a staggered fashion and sell them
to households. 4) a monetary authority who seeks to minimize a quadratic loss function. In
order to provide a convenient separation of the two distortions in the model, I incorporate
labor market frictions in the wholesale sector where prices are exible and introduce sticky
prices in the retail sector among rms who do not employ labor.6
The presence of search frictions in the labor market prevents some unemployed workers
from nding jobs and some hiring rms from lling their vacancies in each period. The ow
of matches between job-seekers and hiring rms is given by the so-called matching function,
Mt =  V
"
t U
1 "
t ;
5I abstract from labor force participation decisions.
6This modeling device is common in the literature. See Ravenna and Walsh (2008a), Ravenna and Walsh
(2010), Thomas (2008), Trigari (2009), Walsh (2003), Walsh (2005).
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in which Mt is the number of matches created in each period; Ut denotes the stock of
unemployed workers; Vt measures the number of vacancies;  is a scaling parameter; and "
is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. It is also convenient to
introduce t = VtUt as a measure of labor market tightness. At each point in time, a vacant job
is matched to an unemployed worker with probability q(t) = MtVt : Similarly, the probability
that any worker looking for a job is matched with an open vacancy at time t is denoted with
p(t) = tq(t) =
Mt
Ut
.
2.1 Households
The model contains a continuum of large identical households on the unit interval with a
measure one of individuals, indexed bym 2 [0; 1], that live within each household. A fraction,
Nt 1 =
R 1
0
Nmt 1dj, of the representative households members are employed by competitive
rms in production activities at the start of period t, receiving real wage wt. The remaining
members, Ut = 1 Nt 1, are unemployed and search for jobs. Those who are employed might
separate from their jobs during period t at an exogenous rate , while unemployed members
have a probability p(t) of nding a new job within the period. Therefore, the households
employment rate evolves according to the following law of motion
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 + p(t) (1 Nt 1) ; (1)
which together with Ut = 1   Nt 1 and t = VtUt describe the so-called Beveridge curve, a
downward sloping relationship between unemployment and vacancies.
The representative household chooses asset holdings, At, and consumption levels, Ct, to
maximize the intertemporal welfare function,7
Ht (Ct; At) = max fu(Ct) + EtHt+1 (Ct+1; At+1)g ;
subject to equation (1) and a budget constraint given by
Ct +
At
Pt
= wtNt + (1 + it 1)
At 1
Pt
+ rt ;
where u(:) is the instantaneous utility function, Ct =
R 1
0
C
( 1)=
jt dj
=( 1)
is the Dixit-
Stiglitz basket of nal goods purchased from the continuum of monopolistic retailers in
which  is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties, At 1 are holdings of one-
period riskless nominal bonds with nominal interest rate between periods t and t 1 equal to
it 1, and rt are real prots from the retail sector. Pt 
R 1
0
P 1 jt dj
 1
1 
measures the price
of a unit of the consumption basket. Accordingly, the optimal allocation of expenditure on
each variety is given by Cjt =

Pjt
Pt
 
Ct.
7I follow the literature in assuming that consumption risks are fully pooled, see Merz (1995) among
others. Since consumption is equalized across members, I can use the same notation for consumption of the
representative household and that of each member.
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The intertemporal rst order condition for the households decision problem with respect
to At yields the standard Euler equation
u0(Ct) =  (1 + it)Et

Pt
Pt+1
u0(Ct+1)

: (2)
It is also possible to obtain the welfare enjoyed by the household from supplying an
additional worker as
@Ht
@Nmt
= u0(Ct)wmt   Etp(t+1) @Ht+1
@Nmt+1
+  (1  )Et @Ht+1
@Nmt+1
; (3)
where the contribution of an additional worker to the householdswelfare is given by the
real wage times the marginal utility of consumption at period t, minus the cost this worker
would incur on the household should the job search continue for another period, plus the
future value of the job conditional on non-separation. Letting V Wmt =

@Ht
@Nmt

1
u0(Ct)

denote
the value of an employed worker to the household in consumption units at period t, equation
(3) can be expressed as
V Wmt = wmt + Et [1    p(t+1)] t;t+1V Wmt+1;
where t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1)
u0(Ct) is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+ 1.
2.2 Competitive Producers (Search Frictions)
A measure-one continuum of perfectly competitive wholesale rms, indexed by i 2 [0; 1],
produce a homogenous intermediate good, Y wit , during period t which they sell to retailers
at real price P
w
t
Pt
. The production function is given by
Y wit = ZtNit;
and is identical across rms. Each wholesale rm employs Nit workers at real wage wit
and faces a common state of technology Zt. Hiring in this sector is subject to search and
matching frictions because rstly, rms have to post vacancies to obtain new employees
which is assumed to come at a utility cost  for each job posting, and secondly, they lose
their existing workers at rate  during period t. The stock of employment at rm i evolves
according to the following law of motion
Nit = (1  )Nit 1 + Vitq(t); (4)
where Vit is the number of vacancies the rm posts at time t; and q(t) is the probability
of lling a vacancy during that period. The timing assumption in this paper is such that
searching workers who nd a match start their jobs immediately within the period, while
those separating from their jobs at time t are not allowed to search until next period. Ac-
cordingly, uctuations in unemployment arise from cyclical variation in hirings as opposed to
separations. See Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) for evidence in support of this phenomenon.
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The rm chooses Vit and Nit to maximize the expected present discounted sum of real
prots (written in recursive form) subject to equation (4).
Jit(Nit; Vit) =
Pwt
Pt
ZtNit   witNit   Vit
u0(Ct)
+ Ett;t+1Jit+1(Nit+1; Vit+1);
where 
u0(Ct) measures the cost of posting a vacancy in consumption terms. The rst order
condition with respect to Vit yields the so-called job posting condition which implies that
the value of a lled job must be equal to the search costs associated with hiring, or
@Jit
@Nit
=

u0(Ct)q(t)
: (5)
The resulting rst order condition with respect to Nit describes the value to the rm of
an additional worker and is given by
@Jit
@Nit
=
Pwt
Pt
Zt   wit + (1  )Ett;t+1
Jit+1
@Nit+1
; (6)
V Jit = MRPNt   wit + (1  )Ett;t+1V Jit+1;
in which the contribution of the worker to the rms lifetime prots is given by the marginal
revenue product of labor, MRPNt =
Pwt
Pt
Zt, minus the real wage, plus the discounted value
of having a match in the following period. In other words, the value of a lled job is equal
to the rms current period prot plus the continuation value of the job. Combining (5) and
(6) yields the rms hiring decision

q(t)
= u0(Ct)

Pwt
Pt
Zt   wit

+ (1  )Et 
q(t+1)
: (7)
According to (7), the search costs associated with hiring (in utils) is equal to the rms
current prot (marginal revenue product minus the real wage) plus the discounted recruit-
ment cost savings if an existing match survives into the following period. In the absence of
search and matching frictions (when  = 0), equation (7) simplies to P
w
t
Pt
Zt = wit. This
condition corresponds to the standard new Keynesian model, where the marginal revenue
product of an employee is equal to the marginal cost of a worker to the rm (real wage); or
equivalently, the marginal cost Ptwit
Zt
must be equated to the nominal price Pwt .
2.3 Monopolistic Firms (Sticky Prices)
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by j 2 [0; 1],
who purchase the wholesale good in a competitive market at real price P
w
t
Pt
, di¤erentiate it
with a technology that converts one unit of intermediate good into one unit of nal good,
Cjt = Yjt = Y
w
it , and then re-sell it to households. Since the only input in the production
function of the retail rm is the intermediate good, each retailers real marginal cost is P
w
t
Pt
.
This is just the inverse of the markup of retail over wholesale goods which in turn depends
on matching frictions that characterize the wholesale sector.
The retail rm seeks to maximize its lifetime prots by setting the price of its product
subject to constraints implied by the demand for its good, the production technology it has
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access to and a restriction on the frequency of price adjustment. I make use of the Calvo
(1983) model of price setting and assume that each period only a randomly chosen fraction,
1  ; of rms can adjust their prices. A retailer that can re-set its price in period t chooses
Pjt to maximize
max
Pjt
Et
1X
i=0
it;t+i

(1 + s)
Pjt
Pt+i
  P
w
t+i
Pt+i

Cjt+i
subject to
Cjt+i =

Pjt
Pt+i
 
Ct+i; (8)
where s is the subsidy rate on sales revenues. This output subsidy is introduced in the
model to o¤set the distortions due to the market power of monopolistically competitive
price-setters.
The optimal pricing equation is then given by
Et
1X
i=0
it;t+iP

t+iCt+i

(1 + s)
P t
Pt+i
  
   1
Pwt+i
Pt+i

= 0; (9)
where P t is the common price chosen by all price-setters. Therefore, retailers set prices as
a constant mark-up over real marginal costs for the expected duration of the price contract.
Using the denition of t;t+i, I can re-write equation (9) as
P t
Pt
=
Et
1X
i=0
()i u0(Ct+i)Ct+i

 1
Pwt+i
Pt+i

Pt+i
Pt

Et
1X
i=0
()i u0(Ct+i)Ct+i (1 + s)

Pt+i
Pt
 1 = KtFt : (10)
From Pt 
R 1
0
Pjt
1 dj
 1
1 
, the average price in period t satises the following law of
motion
P 1 t = (1  )P 1 t + P 1 t 1 : (11)
3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes the social planners allocation as well as equilibrium in the decen-
tralized economy under a exible wage setting mechanism.
3.1 Decentralized Equilibrium with Flexible Wages
To nd the equilibrium in the decentralized economy, it is required to determine the real wage
which appears in both equations (3) and (6). I follow the search and matching literature
in assuming that an intermediate-good producer and a worker determine the real wage
according to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem. Each participant in the bargain
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will receive a xed share of the joint match surplus which is the sum of the surpluses of the
rm, @Jit
@Nit
, and the worker in consumption units,

@Ht
@Nt

1
u0(Ct)

, or
V Jt = (V
J
t + V
W
t );
where  2 (0; 1) is the rms share of the job surplus in period t. The equilibrium real wage
is then given by
wNasht = (1  )

Pwt
Pt
Zt +
Ett+1
u0(Ct)

: (12)
Substituting (12) into equation (7) for the real wage yields the following job creation
condition or the equilibrium in a decentralized economy.

q(t)
= u0(Ct)
Pwt
Pt
Zt + Et [1    (1  )p(t+1)] 
q(t+1)
: (13)
It will also prove useful to nd equilibrium in intermediate goods market which requires
that total supply be equal total demand by retailers, Y wt =
R 1
0
Yjtdj. Using (8), this condition
can be written as
Ctt = Y
w
t = ZtNt;
where t 
R 1
0

Pjt
Pt+i
 
dj is a measure of price dispersion.
3.2 E¢ cient Equilibrium
The constrained-e¢ cient allocation which serves as a benchmark for monetary policy eval-
uation is derived by solving the optimization problem of a benevolent social planner who is
faced with the aggregate technological and resource constraints as well as the labor market
frictions that are present in a decentralized economy. However, the planner internalizes the
e¤ects of search and matching distortions and avoids any ine¢ cient dispersion in relative
prices. It seeks to maximize the joint welfare of households and managers given by
1X
t=0
t fu (Ct)  Vtg
subject to the following set of constraints
Ct = Yt = Y
w
t = ZtNt;
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +Mt;
Mt =  V
"
t U
1 "
t ;
Ut = 1 Nt 1:
Combining the rst order conditions of the social planners problem with respect to Vt
and Nt yields the following optimality condition or the e¢ cient equilibrium

q(t)
= "u0(Ct)Zt + Et [1    (1  ")p(t+1)] 
q(t+1)
: (14)
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Comparing the decentralized outcome (13) with the social planners equilibrium (14)
shows that the e¢ cient allocation (rst best) can only be enforced in the disaggregated
economy if there is no dispersion in relative prices, t = 1, the retail markup is equal to
one, P
w
t
Pt
= 1, as in the standard new Keynesian model, and the rms bargaining power, ,
is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies, ". In contrast
to the standard NK model, employing a subsidy that o¤sets the allocative e¤ects of the
steady-state markup is not su¢ cient to ensure e¢ ciency of the resulting outcome. A too
high bargaining power of workers (rms) can lead to an ine¢ cient level of unemployment
which is above (below) the Pareto optimum. Hence, the so-called Hosios (1990) condition,
in which  = ", is required for e¢ cient vacancy creation. Provided the above conditions are
satised, the economys steady state is e¢ cient meaning that the exible price equilibrium
is exactly the same as the rst best allocation.
4 Linear-Quadratic Analysis
This section derives the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy analysis
in the model economy developed above and log-linearizes its equilibrium conditions. The
resulting outcome is a Linear Quadratic (LQ) model which consists of a set of linear structural
equations and a welfare-theoretic quadratic loss function. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Woodford (2003) show that under certain conditions (e¢ ciency of the steady state being
one), a second order Taylor approximation to the expected present discounted value of utility
of the representative household is related inversely to a conventional quadratic loss function.
In a more general case of an ine¢ cient steady state (owing to monopolistic competition or
search externalities), the LQ method can preserve correct welfare rankings only if second
order approximations are also taken to the model structural relations so that all linear terms
in the welfare criterion are eliminated, see Benigno and Woodford (2005) for details.
In what follows, I assume the following functional form for preferences
u (Ct) =
C1 t
1   ;
where  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
4.1 The Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
The rst step in deriving a LQ model is to take a second-order Taylor expansion to the
welfare of the representative household. Letting X^t = log
 
Xt
X

denote the log deviation
of any variable Xt around its exible price steady-state value X and letting ~Xt = X^t   X^et
denote the gap between X^t and its stochastic e¢ cient (exible price) equilibrium counterpart
X^et , the households welfare criterion admits the following approximation
W '  Et
1X
t=0
t

V C 1

(   ") ^t + q2t + quU^2t+1 + q^
2
t + quzU^t+1Z^t

: (15)
Derivation details as well as expressions for q, qu, q, and quz are given in Appendix
A. When Hosios condition is not satised,  6= ", there is a non zero linear term in (15)
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involving labor market tightness. Consequently, evaluating this function to second order
using an approximate solution for the path of ^t that is accurate only to rst order leads to
incorrect welfare rankings. In other words, one cannot determine the optimal policy, even
up to rst order, using this welfare criterion together with log-linear approximations to the
models structural equations. Ravenna and Walsh (2010) and Thomas (2008) avoid this
problem by assuming  = " which leads to an e¢ cient steady state. An alternative way of
dealing with this issue is to take second order approximations to the rms optimal price
setting relation (10) and job creation condition (13) and substitute the outcomes in (15) to
eliminate the linear term involving ^t. Pursuing the latter option yields
W '  Et
1X
t=1
t


2
t + u

U^t+1   U^t+1
2
+ 

^t   ^t
2
; (16)
where the coe¢ cients in (16) depend on the underlying structural parameters of the model
that govern preferences, the degree of nominal price rigidity, and the search and bargaining
processes in the labor market, see Appendix A for details. U^t+1 and ^

t are target levels of
unemployment and labor market tightness respectively. They both depend on the evolution
of exogenous productivity disturbances (are functions of U^ et+1 and ^
e
t) but need not necessarily
correspond to the exible price equilibrium. Note that equation (16) can nest the welfare
criterion obtained in Ravenna and Walsh (2010) if an e¢ cient labor market allocation is
assumed. In this case U^t+1 = U^
e
t+1 and ^

t = ^
e
t and the second order approximation reads
W '  Et
1X
t=1
t


2
t + u
~U2t+1 + 
~
2
t

:
Since the obtained welfare criterion, (16), is purely quadratic in ination, unemployment,
and labor market tightness (i.e., lacking linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second
order using only a set of rst-order approximations to the models structural relationships.
Equation (16) illustrates the central banks policy objectives. Staggered price adjust-
ment means that ination volatility reduces welfare as it generates relative price dispersion
and leads to an ine¢ cient composition of retail goods for a given level of wholesale output.
Welfare is also reduced by ine¢ cient variation of (un)employment as in the standard new
Keynesian model. Therefore, the second term in (16) measures the success of monetary
policy in stabilizing the welfare relevant (un)employment gap. Labor market tightness gap
arises because of the existence of search externalities and reduces utility of the representative
household. These three gaps can be closed simultaneously only when the steady state is e¢ -
cient, otherwise the policymaker has to trade o¤ dealing with two separate goals: ine¢ cient
price dispersion, and socially suboptimal matches that result in a misallocation of workers
between employment and unemployment.
4.2 Linear Structural Equations
The second step in deriving a LQ model is to take log-linear approximations to the models
structural equilibrium conditions. Appendix B shows how these equilibrium relationships can
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be reduced to a system of three equations in labor market tightness gap, ~t, unemployment
gap, ~Ut, and ination, t.
~t =   1
"p

~Ut+1   u ~Ut

; (17)
~Ut+1 = Et ~Ut+2 +
C
U
1

(it   Ett+1   ret ) ; (18)
t = Ett+1 + p

C
q
(1  ")
h
~t    (1  ) ~t+1
i
  U
C
~Ut+1

+ t; (19)
in which p =
(1 )(1 )

and ret is the real interest rate in the stochastic e¢ cient equilibrium.
Equation (18) is analogous to the conventional IS curve but expressed in terms of unem-
ployment rather than output-gap; while equation (19) is the new Keynesian Phillips curve
in the presence of search frictions. The term in the bracket is the real marginal cost which is
a decreasing (increasing) function of current unemployment8 and expected future (current)
labor market tightness. t is a composite cost-push term, indicating the degree to which the
exogenous productivity shocks preclude simultaneous stabilization of ination and welfare
relevant unemployment gap. The cost push shock arises endogenously in my model as a
result of congestion externalities and is given by
t = p
V C 1


C
U
h
(1  ) ^t+1   (1  ") ^et+1
i
:
When steady state of the model is e¢ cient,  = ", this cost push term is zero and there is
no ination/unemployment trade-o¤.
5 Optimal Policy from a "Timeless Perspective"
Equation (16) serves as an objective function for the central banks policy problem. Opti-
mal monetary policy is obtained by minimizing this equation subject to a sequence of log-
linearized equilibrium constraints given by (17)-(19). The form of the optimization problem
just stated (i.e. distorted steady state case) is the same as in a model with an e¢ cient steady
state; the only di¤erences made by allowing  6= " have to do with the expressions that I
have derived for , u and  as functions of underlying model parameters, the expression
for t as a function of underlying technological disturbances, and the denition of the welfare
relevant unemployment gap U^t+1   U^t+1 as well as labor market tightness gap ^t   ^

t , See
Appendix A for details.
5.1 Welfare Gaps
The model economy developed in this paper involves three distortions: 1) staggered price
setting, 2) search externalities, and 3) monopolistic competition. We can o¤set the distortion
8Unemployment is a predetermined variable.
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due to the market power of monopolistically competitive price-setters by assuming an ap-
propriate output (sales revenue) subsidy and deal with the remaining two frictions. Let W s
denote the welfare of the representative household when prices are sticky and labor market
is subject to search externalities, and let W f denote welfare under exible prices and search
ine¢ ciencies. In the absence of all three frictions, the rst best level of welfare would be W .
Therefore,
W  W s =  W  W f+  W f  W s :
Using the same terminology as in Ravenna and Walsh (2008b), I dene W  W f as the
"search gap" and W f  W s as the "nominal rigidity gap". The former gap, which arises
exclusively as a result of search externalities, is the welfare distance between the rst best
equilibrium and the exible price allocation. The latter gap, which is generated as a result
of price dispersion, is the welfare di¤erence between the exible price equilibrium and the
allocation under which prices are sticky. The Hosios parameter conguration eliminates the
search gap
 
W  W f = 0, while price stability ensures  W f  W s = 0. When  = ", the
policy maker is able to eliminate the only existing gap (nominal rigidity gap) through a zero
ination policy. When we depart from the Hosios condition by allowing  6= ", the search
gap is not zero anymore. Accordingly, the policy maker should aim to minimize the sum of
the two gaps. In this case a policy that eliminates the e¤ects of imperfect competition and
nominal rigidity does not necessarily implement the rst best allocation. Reducing ine¢ cient
unemployment uctuations (closing the search gap) therefore requires a policy that allows
for transitory movements in ination (deviations from price stability). In what follows I
will examine the optimal monetary policy and the role of alternative assumptions about the
e¢ ciency of the steady state in more details.
5.2 The Case for Price Stability (E¢ cient Steady State)
The welfare of the representative household dened in (16) is clearly maximized by a policy
under which ination is zero at all times if two conditions are met: (i) the retail markup is
one, P
w
t
Pt
= 1, and ii) the rms share of surplus, , is equal to the vacancy elasticity of the
matching function, ". The former condition is imposed by an output subsidy, s = 1= (1  ),
that o¤sets the distortion resulting from the market power of monopolistically competitive
retailers. The latter condition, Hosios (1990), implies an e¢ cient level of vacancies and
unemployment and renders a zero search gap. These conditions jointly ensure that steady
state of the model is e¢ cient and if prices were perfectly exible, the equilibrium allocation
of resources would be optimal. Even with the staggered price setting, a zero ination policy
leads to an equilibrium allocation of resources that is the same as if prices were exible;
hence the policy is optimal.
5.3 Ination-Unemployment Trade-O¤ (Distorted Steady State)
In 5.2, I have described a special case in which complete price stability was optimal. In
a more realistic case, when I allow for a distorted steady state (due to search externali-
ties), the cost-push term, t, in the new Keynesian Phillips relationship will be non-zero.
In general, congestion externalities a¤ect the exible-price equilibrium level of unemploy-
ment/labor market tightness while they are irrelevant for the e¢ cient allocation of resources
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and therefore they give rise to uctuations in the cost-push term. When t 6= 0, it is not
possible simultaneously to fully stabilize both ination and the welfare-relevant unemploy-
ment gap; the optimal trade-o¤ between the two stabilization objectives generally involves
some degree of variation in both variables in response to technological shocks. To better
understand the nature of this trade-o¤, I perform a simulation exercise in the remaining
parts of this section.
5.3.1 Baseline Calibration (E¢ cient Allocation)
The baseline monthly calibration of the model parameters to US data is summarized in
Table 1. The discount factor, , is set to 0:997, corresponding to an annual real interest rate
of 4 percent in the steady state. Using thirty-three sets of estimates of wage and income
elasticities, Chetty (2006) argues that the mean implied value of relative risk aversion in the
utility function is 0.71, with a range of 0.15 to 1.78 in the additive utility case. Therefore I
choose a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , of 0:71. The elasticity of substitution among
di¤erentiated goods, , is set to 7:67: This value translates into a 15% mark-up of prices
over retailers marginal cost. Price adjustment probability, 1   , is assumed to be 0:25,
implying an average duration of price contracts of 4 months. I set the vacancy elasticity of
matches, ", to 0:6 following the US evidence in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). To focus
on the implications of search externalities for the conduct of optimal monetary policy, the
rms share of surplus, , is allowed to vary in simulations. Following Gertler and Trigari
(2009), I choose a monthly separation rate, , of 0:035 to match the evidence that jobs last
for two and a half years. Based on the evidence presented in Shimer (2005), the value of job
nding rate is set to p = 0:3, which implies a steady state unemployment rate of 0:1. The
vacancy lling rate, q, is equal to 0:7, following the evidence presented by Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000). The value for the utility cost of posting vacancies, , is obtained from the
steady state relationships. Finally, the aggregate productivity shock, Zt, follows an AR(1)
process with a persistence of 0:8.
5.3.2 Steady State Analysis
Search and matching models exhibit congestion or search externalities due to the tightness
of the labor market, the relative number of hiring rms to searching workers. One additional
searching worker in the market increases the probability that a hiring rm will match with
a job-seeker but decreases the probability that a searching worker already in the market will
match with a rm. Hosios (1990) shows that congestion externalities are balanced, and labor
market allocations are optimal when the bargaining power of workers equals the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to vacancies. The Hosios parameter conguration,
 = ", ensures that the decentralized allocation is the same as the planners solution which
internalizes the search externalities. However, the Hosios condition need not hold empirically.
Table 2 presents the implied steady state values of the models key variables for two cases:
(i)  = " and (ii)  6= ". To nd the steady state values of unemployment and labor market
tightness, I jointly solve the following two equations for U and  using the parameter values
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Discount factor  0:997
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  0:71
Elasticity of substitution across goods  7:67
Price adjustment probability 1   0:25
Vacancy elasticity of matches " 0:6
Separation rate  0:035
Job nding rate p 0:3
Vacancy lling rate q 0:7
Persistence of the productivity shock  0:8
given in Table 1.
1   (1    (1  ) ") =  
" 1
(1  U) ; (20)
U =

 " + 
; (21)
where (20) is the steady state evaluation of equation (13) augmented with p =  " and
q =  " 1, while (21) is derived from p

= N
U
and N = 1   U , see Appendix C for details.
Having found the steady state value of , I can solve for the job nding rate, p, and the
vacancy lling probability, q. Steady state value of vacancies, V , is then calculated from
the denition of labor market tightness.9 Second column of Table 2 shows that if workers
bargaining power increases to (1  ) = 0:7 > "; the steady state unemployment rate will
be ine¢ ciently high and rmsincentives to post vacancies will be low. Consequently, the
steady state level of the labor market tightness will be ine¢ ciently low.
5.3.3 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection analyzes the optimal responses of unemployment, labor market tightness
and ination to productivity disturbances under di¤erent assumptions about the e¢ ciency
of the labor market allocation. I express the ination rate in annual percent deviation from
the exible price steady-state, while unemployment and labor market tightness are denoted
9Note that in case (i), I used the parameter values in Table 1 for unemployment, job nding probability
and vacancy lling rate and calculated ; while in case (ii), I found the values of labor market tightness,
unemployment, p and q directly from the steady state relationships.
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Table 2: Steady State Properties, E¢ cient vs Ine¢ cient Bargaining
Variable E¢ cient Allocation,  = " Ine¢ cient Allocation, (1  ) > "
Unemployment U 0:10 0:12
Vacancies V 0:043 0:036
Tightness  0:43 0:29
Job nding rate p 0:30 0:24
Vacancy lling rate q 0:70 0:81
in monthly percentage deviations. Figure 1 plots the impulse responses of these variables to
an unexpected rise of the productivity by one percent. To explore the explicit implications of
search externalities (e¢ ciency of the steady state) for the determination of optimal monetary
policy, simulation results are produced for di¤erent values of the bargaining power. When the
rms share of surplus, , is equal to the vacancy elasticity of the matching function, ", the
exible price equilibrium is exactly the same as the social planners allocation. Consequently,
in response to productivity shocks, actual unemployment moves with the e¢ cient (exible
price) unemployment and as such optimal policy calls for complete price stability. In this
case, the search gap and cost push shocks are both zero and monetary policy is able to
insulate ination and unemployment gap from disturbances (solid lines in Figure 1).
Recall that the vacancy elasticity of the matching function, ", is set to 0.6. For values of
 di¤erent from ", the exible price steady state is di¤erent from social planners equilibrium
(the labor market allocation is ine¢ cient), and the search gap is non-zero. Therefore, I
expect the policy maker to be faced with a trade-o¤ between moving the policy instrument
to stabilize ination or to correct for ine¢ cient unemployment uctuations in response to
productivity shocks. This scenario is represented by dashed lines in Figure 1. A positive
productivity shock raises the surplus of a match between a rm and a worker, leads rms to
post more vacancies, pushes down the unemployment rate, and increases the labor market
tightness. When the workers bargaining power is ine¢ ciently high (1  ) = 0:7, the impact
of the productivity shock on labor market tightness is smaller as rms take a lower share of
the surplus and have less incentives to post vacancies. This renders the unemployment rate
larger than the e¢ cient one. The same shock also creates a gap between the exible price
equilibrium and the social planners allocation, generates a cost push term, t, in the new
Keynesian Phillips curve (owing to search externalities), and produces policy trade-o¤s.
The decision to post vacancies and to hire workers depends on expected labor market
tightness for which future monetary policy position matters. Under commitment, the policy
maker can credibly anchor expectations about future variables and as such it might deviate
from complete price stability for some periods in order to steer rms incentives to post
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of selected variables under optimal policy to a one
percent productivity shock for two cases: (i) e¢ cient allocation and (ii) ine¢ cient
equilibrium.
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vacancies towards the e¢ cient level and speed up the process of convergence to the unem-
ployment target, U^t+1. In this case the monetary authority tries to correct for the ine¢ ciently
high unemployment through time-varying ination, hence we observe larger deviations from
price stability and lower unemployment uctuations. Another reason for this observation is
the higher weight the policy maker puts on unemployment gap stabilization, u. As shown
in Appendix A, u depends positively on the steady state value of unemployment, U , and
negatively on    ". With an ine¢ cient equilibrium,  is smaller that " and U is larger than
its e¢ cient counterpart; both contributing to a higher u in the loss function.
6 Concluding remarks
I have derived an explicit second order approximation to the welfare of the representative
agent when the exible price equilibrium is di¤erent from the rst best allocation, due to
search externalities. I have shown that the resulting welfare-theoretic loss function depends
on ination, unemployment gap, and an additional quadratic term involving labor market
tightness. These gaps could be interpreted as the percentage deviation of unemployment
(and market tightness) from a target variable that depends on the evolution of exogenous
shocks. In general, there is thus no reason for the target level of unemployment (and market
tightness) to correspond to the exible price allocation.
It is shown that productivity shocks may preclude simultaneous stabilization of ination
and the welfare-relevant unemployment gap; the extent to which this is true depends on
the degree of variability of the cost push term in the new Keynesian Phillips curve, the
relative weight on unemployment stabilization in the quadratic loss function, and the degree
of the violation of the Hosios condition. The analysis of optimal monetary policy above
assumes (i) perfect unemployment risk sharing among households members, (ii) full labor
force participation, and (iii) only one source of disturbance (technological shock). How the
policy implications may vary once we allow for imperfect risk sharing, variable labor market
participation, and shocks other than technology are topics worthy of investigation.
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Appendix A: Second Order Expansions
Approximation to the Representative Households Welfare
To drive a second order approximation to the representative households welfare, it is nec-
essary to introduce some additional notation. Let X^ = log
 
Xt
X

be the log deviation of any
variable Xt around its steady-state value X. Notice that we can write any function X
y
t as
ey ln(Xt) which can then be expanded in the logarithm of its arguments around the logarithm
of their steady state levels such that the outcome is in log deviation terms. Employing this
notation and assuming a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility, the households
welfare can be approximated by
U (Ct; Nt; Vt) ' C1 

C^t +
1  
2
C^2t

  V

V^t +
1
2
V^ 2t

+ t:i:p:+O3; (22)
where Ok indicates terms of order k   th and higher in the size of the shocks and t:i:p:
represents terms independent of policy. In order to substitute for C^t and V^t in (22), I
perform the following second order expansions for market clearing condition, Ctt = ZtNt,
and vacancies, Vt = tUt, or
C^t =  ^t + N^t + 1
2
N^2t + Z^tN^t + Z^t +
1
2
Z^2t  
1
2
C^2t ; (23)
V^t +
1
2
V^ 2t = ^t + U^t +
1
2

^t + U^t
2
: (24)
I can express (23) in terms of U^t but it requires performing the following approximation
to Ut = 1 Nt 1, or
N^t 1 +
1
2
N^2t 1 =  
U
C

U^t +
1
2
U^2t

=  
p

U^t +
1
2
U^2t

; (25)
in which I have used the steady state relationship p

= N
U
. Inserting (25) into (23) and using
N = 1  U = C, I obtain the following approximation for the market clearing condition
C^t =  ^t   U
C

U^t+1 +
1
2
U^2t+1

+ Z^t +
1
2
Z^2t  
1
2

U
C
2
U^2t+1; (26)
from which I can nd an expression for C^2t :
C^2t =

U
C
2
U^2t+1   2
U
C
U^t+1Z^t:
The next step is to approximate the Beveridge curve. The second order expansion for
the law of motion of employment, Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +  "t (1 Nt 1), reads
N^t +
1
2
N^2t = (1    p)

N^t 1 +
1
2
N^2t 1

+ 

"^t +
1
2
"2^
2
t

  p"N^t 1^t: (27)
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Combining the above equation with (25) yields
U^t+1 +
1
2
U^2t+1 = u

U^t +
1
2
U^2t

  "p

^t +
1
2
"^
2
t + U^t^t

; (28)
where u = 1    p. Multiplying both sides of (28) by t and integrating across t, admits
the following equation for the present discounted value of unemployment
1X
t=0
tU^t+1 =
1X
t=0
t

  "V C

 (V C + U)

^t +
1
2
"^
2
t +
"p
u
^
2
t +
1
u
U^t+1^t

  1
2
U^2t+1

; (29)
in which I have used the steady state relationship "p
1 (1  p) =
"V C
(V C+U)
and ^tU^t =
"p
u
^
2
t +
1
u
U^t+1^t. Inserting (26) and (24) into (22) and integrating forward, I can write the
expected present discounted value of Households Utility as
W ' Et
1X
t=0
t

 V C 1^t   V C
 + U
C
U^t+1

+ (30)
+Et
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
 ^t   12
n

 
U
C
2
+ V C
+U
C
o
U^2t+1   V C 1

1
2
+ "p
1  p

^
2
t
 V C 1 1
u
U^t+1^t   (1  ) UC U^t+1Z^t
9>=>; :
Substituting (29) into (30) eliminates the linear term involving U^t. Therefore
W '  V C
 1

(   ")Et
1X
t=0
t^t+ (31)
+Et
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
  
2p
2t   12
 
U
C
2
U^2t+1   12 V C
 1


   "2 + 2 (   ") "p
u

^
2
t
 V C 1

 "
u
U^t+1^t   (1  ) UC U^t+1Z^t
9>=>; ;
in which I have used the approximation of price dispersion term,
1X
t=0
t^t =

2p
1X
t=0
t2t .
The unemployment transition equation,
U^t+1 = uU^t   "p^t; (32)
implies the recursive expression
U^2t+1 = 
2
uU^
2
t + ("p)
2 ^
2
t   2"pu^tU^t;
which can then be integrated forward to obtain
1X
t=1
tU^t+1^t =  1
2
1X
t=1
t

"p^
2
t +
1  2u
"p
U^2t+1

: (33)
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Using (33), I can write equation (31) as
W '  Et
1X
t=0
t

V C 1

(   ") ^t + q2t + quU^2t+1 + q^
2
t + quzU^t+1Z^t

; (34)
where the coe¢ cients in equation (34) are dened as
q =

2p
;
qu =
1
2
(


U
C
2
  V C
 1

(   ") 1  
2
u
"pu
)
;
 =
1
2
V C 1


   "2 + (   ") "p
u

;
uz = (1  ) U
C
:
Approximations to the Decentralized Equilibrium Conditions
The linear term involving ^t in equation (34) can be eliminated using second order approxi-
mations to the rms optimal price setting relation (10) and job creation condition (13).
Optimal Price Setting Condition
Dividing both sides of (11) by P 1 t and substituting an expression for
P t
Pt
using (10) yields
1   1t
1   =

Ft
Kt
 1
;
where t = PtPt 1 . This equation can be written exactly as
log

1  
 1
t
1  

= (   1) (logKt   logFt) : (35)
A second order approximation to the left hand side of (35) takes the form
log

1  
 1
t
1  

=

1   (   1)

t +
1
2
   1
1   
2
t +O
3

: (36)
Substituting (36) into (35) yields
t   1
2
   1
1   
2
t +O
3 =
1  


K^t   F^t

: (37)
Kt and Ft are dened as
Kt = Et
1X
i=0
()i kt+i ; kt+i = C
1 
t+i mct+i

Pt+i
Pt

;
Ft = Et
1X
i=0
()i ft+i ; ft+i = C
1 
t+i

Pt+i
Pt
 1
:
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These denitions imply second order expansions
K^t +
1
2
K^2t +O
3 = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
()i

k^t+i +
1
2
k^2t+i

+O3; (38)
F^t +
1
2
F^ 2t +O
3 = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
()i

f^t+i +
1
2
f^ 2t+i

+O3; (39)
where k^t+i and f^t+i are given by
k^t+i = (1  ) C^t+i + cmct+i +  P^t+i   P^t = (1  ) C^t+i + cmct+i +  t+iP
j=t+1
j;
f^t+i = (1  ) C^t+i + (   1)

P^t+i   P^t

= (1  ) C^t+i + (   1)
t+iP
j=t+1
j:
Equations (38) and (39) can be used to obtain a second order expansion for the right
hand side of (37) as
K^t   F^t = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
()i

k^t+i   f^t+i + 1
2

k^2t+i   f^ 2t+i

  1
2

K^t   F^t

K^t + F^t

= (1  )
(
Et
1X
i=0
()i

k^t+i   f^t+i + 1
2

k^2t+i   f^ 2t+i

  1
2

1  tZt
)
; (40)
where I have used (37) to substitute for

K^t   F^t

and
K^t + F^t = (1  )At
At = Et
1X
i=0
()i

k^t+i + f^t+i

:
I can use the denitions of k^t+i and f^t+i as well as (37) to further simplify (40). The
resulting equation can be written recursively as
t +
1
2
   1
1   
2
t +
1
2
(1  )tAt
=
(1  ) (1  )


k^t   f^t + 1
2

k^2t   f^ 2t

+
+
1
2
Et
2
t+1 + Ett+1 +
1
2

   1
1   Et
2
t+1 +
1
2
 (1  )Ett+1At+1:
The above equation when integrated forward yields
Vt0 = Et
1X
t=0
t

p
cmct + 1
2
cmc2t + (1  ) C^tcmct+ 22t

;
where p =
(1 )(1 )

:
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Job Creation Condition
Assuming a CRRA utility specication and using the relationshipsmct =
PWt
Pt
, q(t) =  
" 1
t ,
p(t) =  
"
t , Ct = 
 1
t ZtNt, and Ut = 1 Nt 1, I can write (13) as

 
1 "t = mct

tN
 
t Z
1 
t + Et

1    (1  ) "t+1
 
 
1 "t+1 :
The second order expansion of the above equation reads

q

(1  ") ^t + 1
2
(1  ")2 ^2t

(41)
= C 
8<: cmct +
1
2
cmc2t + ^t + UC U^t+1 + 12  CU + 1 +   UC 2 U^2t+1
+U
C
U^t+1cmct + (1  )UC U^t+1Z^t + (1  ) Z^tcmct + (1  ) Z^t
9=;
+

q

(1  )

(1  ") ^t+1 + 1
2
(1  ")2 ^2t+1

  p (1  )

^t+1 +
1
2
^
2
t+1

:
Multiplications of the rst order approximation to the real marginal cost, cmct, and (32)
imply
U^t+1cmct = V C
pU
n
(1  ") U^t+1^t   mcU^t+1^t+1
o
  U
C
U^2t+1   (1  ) U^t+1Z^t;
where mc = (1  ) (1  ")   p (1  ). I can substitute this expression into (41) for the
cross-product term involving U^t+1cmct and integrate the result forward to obtain
1X
t=0
t
"cmct + 1
2
cmc2t + ^t + UC U^t+1 + 12

1
U
  

U
C
2
U^2t+1
#
(42)
=
1X
t=0
t
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
V C 1

 
   "+ 1 
U

^t
+
n
1
2
V C 1

 
"2   2"+  + 1 
U

+ " V C
 1

mc
u
o
^
2
t
+ V C
 1

 "
u
U^t+1^t   (1  ) Z^tcmct
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
;
where I have used the steady state relations 
 
1 " = 
q
and  " = p and the fact that ^t 1
and ^t 1U^t 1 are independent of policy as of date zero. The second order approximation to
the rms optimal price setting condition can be substituted into (42) for cmct+ 12cmc2t to get
1X
t=0
t

 U
C
U^t+1 +
V C 1


   "+ 1  
U

^t

=
1X
t=0
t
26666664
  
2p
2t + ^t +
1
2

 
   2 + 1
U
  
U
C
2
U^2t+1n
 1
2
V C 1

 
"2   2"+  + 1 
U
  "V C 1

mc
u
o
^
2
t
 V C 1

 "
u
U^t+1^t   (1  )2 UC U^t+1Z^t
37777775 ;
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in which I have used
C^tcmct = U
C
2
U^2t+1+
V C 1"mc
u
^
2
t+
V C 1 (   ")
u
U^t+1^t+
U
C
(1  ) U^t+1Z^t+Z^tcmct:
I can now substitute in for the linear term involving unemployment (29) and simplify the
result by using (33) to obtain
 V C
 1


#+    "+ 1  
U
 1X
t=1
t^t (43)
=
1X
t=1
t
8>>>><>>>>:
+(1  ) 
2p
2t +

1
2
 (1  )  U
C
2   1
2
V C 1

(   "+ #) 1 2u
"pu

U^2t+1
+
 
1
2
V C 1

 
#"+ "2   2"+  + 1 
U

+ "V C
 1
u
 
1
2
#p+ mc   12p (   ")
 ! ^2t + (1  )2 UC U^t+1Z^t
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
where # = "U
V C+U
.
Evaluating the CBs Loss Function
I can now multiply both sides of (43) by $ =  "
#+ "+ 1 
U
and insert the resulting expression
in (31) to eliminate all remaining linear terms in the second order approximations.
W '  Et
1X
t=1
t


2
t + uU^
2
t+1 + ^
2
t + uzU^t+1Z^t

: (44)
The coe¢ cients in equation (44) are dened below
 =

2p
(1  (1  )$) ;
u =
1
2
(


U
C
2
(1  (1  )$)  V C
 1

(   ") (1  )
U
 
   "+ #+ 1 
U
 1  2u
"pu
)
;
 =
1
2
"V C 1

(
(1  ")
 
2 (   ") + #+ 1 
U
   "+ #+ 1 
U
!
+
   "
u
 
p1 
U
  2u (1  ")
   "+ #+ 1 
U
!)
;
uz = (1  ) U
C
(1  (1  )$) :
Letting ~Xt = X^t   X^et denote the gap between X^t and its stochastic e¢ cient (exible
price) equilibrium counterpart X^et , I can proceed to obtain a version of the loss function that
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consists of a set of appropriately dened gaps involving ination, unemployment, and labor
market tightness. To deal with the only cross product term in (44), I use
Z^t =
C
q
1  "
1   ^
e
t   
C
q
u
1  "
1   ^
e
t+1  

1  
U
C
U^ et+1; (45)
and multiply it by U^t+1 and integrate it forward to obtain
1X
t=1
tU^t+1Z^t =  
1X
t=1
t

"V C
U
1  "
1   ^t^
e
t +

1  
U
C
U^t+1U^
e
t+1

:
Thus, we have that
W '  Et
1X
t=1
t


2
t + u

U^t+1   U^t+1
2
+ 

^t   ^t
2
; (46)
where U^t+1 =
1
2u

 
U
C
2
(1  (1  )$) U^ et+1 and ^

t =
1
2
"V C 1

(1  ") (1  (1  )$) ^et :
Appendix B: The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
The model economy involves the following core log-linearized equations.
Consumption Euler equation
C^t = EtC^t+1  

1


(it   Ett+1) :
Aggregate resource constraint and production function
C^t = Y^t = Z^t + N^t:
Unemployment
N^t 1 =  U
C
U^t =  
p
U^t:
Evolution of employment
N^t = uN^t 1 + "^t:
Job market clearing condition or decentralized equilibrium
cmct = C
q
n
(1  ") ^t   mc^t+1
o
  U
C
U^t+1   (1  ) Z^t:
Price adjustment equation
t = Ett+1 + pcmct:
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I can proceed to obtain a version of the model that consists of three structural equations
in ^t, U^t, and t as follows.
^t =   1
"p

U^t+1   uU^t

;
U^t+1 = EtU^t+2 +
C
U
1

(it   Ett+1) + C
U
(1  ) Z^t;
t = Ett+1 + p

C
q
h
(1  ") ^t   mc^t+1
i
  U
C
U^t+1   (1  ) Z^t

Using (45), I can re-write these equations in gap terms - variables expressed relative to
their stochastic e¢ cient equilibrium counterparts.
~t =   1
"p

~Ut+1   u ~Ut

;
~Ut+1 = Et ~Ut+2 +
C
U
1

(it   Ett+1   ret ) ;
t = Ett+1 + p

C
q
(1  ")
h
~t    (1  ) ~t+1
i
  U
C
~Ut+1

+ t;
where t = p
V C 1

 
C
U
 h
(1  ) ^t+1   (1  ") ^et+1
i
:
Appendix C: Useful Steady State Relationships
1

  (1    p) = 

p+
q
C

=
p (V C + U)
V C
p

=
N
U
 =
p
q
=
V
U
C = N = 1  U
U =

p+ 
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